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Shifting Emergencies from the Political to the Legal Sphere: Placing the United 
Kingdom’s Derogations from the ECHR in Historical Context 
 
C.R.G. Murray
*
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The need to protect ‘political expediency’ long undermined the development of international 
human rights.
1
 Governments had so long used other states’ human-rights records as 
bargaining chips in international relations, emphasising some perceived abuses whilst 
downplaying others, that even in the aftermath of the Second World War the new European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) attracted considerable scepticism.
2
 The ECHR 
institutions’ handling of applications arising in the context of war or other emergency 
circumstances would be vital to the success of these fledgling arrangements because, 
although constitutional rights and civil liberties had long been features of Europe’s domestic 
legal orders, responses to emergencies had historically been dominated by raison d’État.3 
Whereas this approach marginalised the role of domestic courts in emergency situations, 
under the ECHR states could continue to ‘take measures derogating from its obligations’ in 
response to ‘war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, but only ‘to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.4  
This provision was designed ‘to ensure that even exceptional state action remains 
governed by independent norms, which in turn allows for supervision by independent 
tribunals’.5 One of the ECHR institutions’ first tasks was therefore to develop the legal 
requirements for derogations, in the face of two countervailing concerns. If Strasbourg was 
too rigorous in its interpretation of Article 15’s requirements, states might begin to abandon 
the ECHR system before it had the opportunity to establish itself. By contrast, if states were 
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given too much leeway in early ECHR jurisprudence, derogations could become a means of 
legalising egregious human rights abuses. The uncertainty surrounding how Article 15 would 
operate persisted until the early derogation jurisprudence unfolded in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Despite not having a constitutional concept of état de siège
6
 as maintained in France, or 
the ability to invoke emergency powers which are protected from challenge on constitutional 
grounds which operates under the Irish Constitution,
7
 the UK insisted on the inclusion of 
Article 15 during the drafting of the ECHR
8
 and has relied upon derogations more frequently 
than any other contracting state. Indeed, in the face of ministerial assertions that ‘[d]erogation 
is not something that any government … enter into lightly’,9 the UK has maintained one or 
more operative derogations for most of the ECHR’s history. This article evaluates the UK’s 
persistent use of derogations and how, even in the face of a continuing terrorist threat, it 
broke this reliance in recent years. I place the UK’s approach to derogations in historical 
context by evaluating them by reference to the UK’s pre-ECHR approach to emergency 
situations. The ECHR arrangements in theory provided an extra European layer of oversight 
in emergency situations and invoking a derogation amounted to an international admission 
that a state needed far-reaching powers to bring such a situation under control. In operation, 
however, Strasbourg’s oversight was so light-touch as to make derogations an attractive 
option for UK policy makers. The UK Government also manipulated the apparently legalised 
nature of the Article 15 test to curtail parliamentary oversight. This light touch jurisprudence 
has given way to efforts by the Court to foster more effective oversight by domestic courts 
and parliamentary processes. Since Strasbourg has developed these expectations over the role 
of domestic oversight, derogations have lost much of their former allure.  
 
2. Martial Law, Emergency Powers and Parliament 
 
By the turn of the twentieth century the common law powers possessed by the UK 
Government in an emergency context had long been shrouded in uncertainty.
10
 Through the 
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nineteenth century authoritative voices insisted that a soldier tasked with restoring order in 
the face of a riot or insurrection is ‘only a citizen armed in a particular manner’.11 In other 
words, the authorities enjoyed no inherent special powers with regard to emergencies under 
the UK’s “ancient constitution”, short of a declaration of martial law. Where the Crown’s 
forces resorted to force to address an emergency, the common law ordinarily required that it 
be proportionate to the threat at issue.
12
 Martial law, by contrast, enabled the military to take 
all steps within their power to address an emergency, including trial of civilians by means of 
military tribunal, provided it is ‘used in case of necessity, and imminent danger … as in cases 
of rebellion [or] sudden invasion’.13 But doubt persisted over whether martial law could be 
invoked if circumstances were not so grave as to prevent the ordinary courts from 
functioning.
14
 Imperial expansion, increasing prosperity and peace in Great Britain (if not in 
Ireland and many of the colonies), however, had long combined to push uncertainties over the 
‘disengagement between martial law as theory and as praxis’ from policy makers’ agendas.15  
The spectre of imperial collapse and the exigencies of the First and Second World War 
brought the issue of these ‘meagre’ powers back to prominence in the twentieth century.16 In 
the face of these threats the courts restricted their oversight of the operation of emergency 
powers. An early indication that the bounds upon martial law were loosening came during the 
Boer War in the D.F. Marais case,
17
 a challenge before the Privy Council to the refusal by the 
Courts in the Cape Colony to consider the legality of an arrest made under martial law 
powers. Lord Halsbury concluded that provided the threshold of war or insurrection 
necessitating the invocation of martial law had been met, judges would not assess the 
proportionality of actions taken durante bello; ‘let the fact of actual war be established, and 
there is an universal consensus of opinion that the civil Courts have no jurisdiction to call in 
question the propriety of the action of military authorities’.18 Parliament might have been able 
to pass legislation curtailing the use of martial law, but Conservative MPs ‘promoted British 
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imperial policy’19 and the Government’s parliamentary majority allowed it to fend off 
opposition. Even when the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain admitted that the 
institution of martial law was ‘illegal and unconstitutional’,20 he quietened dissent by 
declaring that ‘[t]he Ministers of this country … have, even in times of perfect peace, done 
illegal and unconstitutional acts from time to time, and we have had to come to the House of 
Commons for an indemnity.
21
 Nonetheless, the Marais case itself became something of a 
cause célèbre, with several parliamentarians taking a close interest into his treatment. In a 
largely forgotten postscript to the Privy Council decision, he would be quietly released a few 
months later.
22
 
Two decades later, against the backdrop of the Irish War of Independence, Malony CJ 
refused to accept challenges to uses of military power during the conflict even though the 
civilian courts were still in session on the basis that ‘[w]hen peace is restored, acts in excess 
of what necessity requires … may require the protection of indemnifying legislation.23 This 
reassertion of the Marais position did not, however, prevent the courts from hearing such 
claims once order had been restored. That an Indemnity Act might ultimately be needed had 
cooled the UK military’s enthusiasm for the seemingly unrestricted powers available under 
martial law even before the First World War.
24
 Officers craved ‘the supposed certainty of 
statute law, rather than the somewhat open-ended flexibility of the common law’, with its 
attendant risk that Parliament might refuse to pass a potentially unpopular Indemnity Act 
once an emergency was over.
25
  
 Instead of relying upon martial law, a pattern emerged of the UK Parliament enacting 
specific legislation, for the duration of an emergency situation, which granted special powers 
to the authorities to tackle the danger in question. At the outbreak of the First World War 
fears over the UK’s large expatriate German population led to the introduction of detention 
without trial of anyone suspected of having German family connections or sympathies for the 
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duration of hostilities. This power was the centrepiece of what Brian Simpson described as ‘a 
comprehensive code of emergency powers’ under the Defence of the Realm Acts 1914-
1915.
26
 The powers proved so useful that even after the First World War ended the UK 
authorities were determined to be able to continue to access many of them in the context of 
the Irish War of Independence and they were repackaged in the Restoration of Order in 
Ireland Act 1920. This legislation provided a partial legal basis for the Government’s 
emergency response in Ireland alongside martial law.
27
 Even after most of Ireland gained its 
independence the authorities in the six counties of Northern Ireland, which remained part of 
the UK, enacted a system of special powers legislation on the basis of their experience of the 
political violence surrounding partition to enable them to tackle a mixture of real and 
assumed on-going threats.
28
 From these beginnings, tailored emergency codes ‘became the 
model both in colonial territories and in the United Kingdom itself’.29 They would be 
introduced at the outbreak of the Second World War
30
 and at the onset of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaign in England in 1974.
31
 Although quasi-permanent 
special powers edifices were constructed in the form of the Emergency Powers Act 1920 and 
its successor the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the use of this legislation has been focused 
upon instances of industrial unrest.
32
  
 As with martial law, in the pre-ECHR era the broad framing of the powers contained in 
the UK’s statutory emergency codes restricted judicial oversight. During the First World War 
it was posited that the discretion conferred on the executive under the Defence of the Realm 
Acts was so broad that it could be used to authorise extra-judicial killing.
33
 In the leading 
case on the Acts, ex parte Zadig,
34
 Lord Dunedin did not demur that Parliament had 
conferred particularly extensive powers with little by way of oversight; ‘[T]he fault, if fault 
there be, lies in the fact that the British Constitution has entrusted to the two Houses of 
Parliament … an absolute power untrammelled by any written instrument obedience to which 
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may be compelled by some judicial body’.35 The courts treated Parliament as the focal point 
of scrutiny of the executive in times of crisis, a position which was remarkable given that the 
Defence of the Realm legislation contained ‘no provision that regulations made under the Act 
require parliamentary approval’.36 Once Parliament had granted a discretionary power the 
Courts’ oversight of such measures was limited to assessing whether there had been an act of 
bad faith on the part of the Executive.
37
  
 This concentration upon parliamentary oversight of emergency codes from the First 
World War onwards proved problematic, as parliamentarians were required to fly in the face 
of public concern over security threats and a push by the executive for enhanced security 
powers.
38
 Lord Finlay did at least recognise in ex parte Zadig that even parliamentary 
oversight was constrained in these circumstances; ‘it may be necessary in time of great public 
danger to entrust great powers to His Majesty in Council, and ... Parliament may do so feeling 
certain such powers will be reasonably exercised’.39 Uncertainty naturally coloured 
parliamentary debate given the Government’s refusal to make security assessments public 
and given the ‘the size of the stakes’.40 Whilst some civil-liberties-enhancing concessions 
were won by parliamentary opposition during the enactment of the Defence of the Realm 
Acts, these interventions ‘ought not to be exaggerated’ when considered against the 
legislature’s ‘failure adequately to ensure that regulations were given proper consideration’.41 
A pattern was set which extended through the Second World War and beyond. 
 
3. The UK adapts to the ECHR 
 
Derogations involve an ECHR state’s notification to the Council of Europe of the suspension 
of specific substantive human rights to enable it to address an on-going crisis. The prohibition 
of torture and slavery and the right not to be subjected to retrospective criminalisation are 
excluded from the ambit of derogations, as is the right to life ‘except in respect of deaths 
                                                 
35
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37
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resulting from lawful acts of war’.42 The developing UK practice of enacting an emergency 
code to deal with emergency situations could be made to conform to these requirements. Just 
as an emergency code, for the duration it is in effect, would abrogate certain human rights, so 
an accompanying derogation would act as its external face, preventing the UK from falling 
foul of its international commitments. The ECHR did not stipulate that the notification 
needed to give extensive detail as to the basis for asserting an emergency to the Council of 
Europe, nor did it impose a duty to regularly report on the use of the emergency powers once 
a derogation was in place. Parliamentary probing, media or civil society investigation or 
subsequent litigation would often be needed to bring further details of the actual operation of 
emergency powers to light. 
Caroline Elkins, assessing the suppression of the Mau Mau insurgency in 1950s Kenya, 
has noted the incongruence between the UK’s acceptance that the right to liberty under the 
ECHR extended to Kenya and its reliance upon ‘a policy of mass detention’ in this colony.43 
From the outset of the ECHR, parts of the UK Government, and in particular the Colonial 
Office, reacted to the new human rights mechanisms with hostility, strenuously resisting the 
ability of individuals to petition the Strasbourg institutions.
44
 This official mind set was the 
product of concerns over the need to preserve freedom of action in response to emergency 
situations.
45
 Given the Colonial Office’s distain for the ECHR, derogations were often issued 
late and the reasons provided to the Council of Europe tended to be ‘laconic in the 
extreme’.46 On the ground, colonial administrators responding to emergencies tended to 
assume that tried-and-tested ‘UK precedents’,47 such as maintaining internment for the 
duration of an emergency, were in line with the new human rights requirements.
48
 At the 
outset of the Kenya Emergency, for example, many of the communications which flowed 
back and forth between London and Nairobi concerned how internment had functioned in the 
UK during the Second World War
49
 and how to map Kenyan measures onto that 
experience.
50
 Even if such measures did impinge upon ECHR rights, there was seemingly 
                                                 
42
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45
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46
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47
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48
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maintained that ‘no one seriously says that English Common Law does not protect the rights of freedoms, at 
least to the extent which the Convention says’; HL Deb, vol.212, col.624 (18 Nov 1958).  
49
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50
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(Governor) (12 Mar 1953). 
8 
 
little to fear from potential inter-state actions when many other ECHR states were embroiled 
in similar late-colonial entanglements.
51
 In the Kenyan context it took some time before the 
ECHR compatibility of these measures came to be considered, in large part because the treaty 
entered force nearly a year into the Emergency and at the height of military operations.
52
 In 
early 1954, in light of proposals to increase the use of internment, a note on the application of 
the ECHR to the Kenya Emergency finally reached the Prime Minister’s desk. With a 
perfunctory tick Sir Winston Churchill signalled his approval for a derogation.
53
 
The ECHR’s profile for colonial authorities increased significantly when the Cyprus 
Emergency became the first colonial-era emergency to be subject to the scrutiny of the ECHR 
institutions. Greece launched two inter-state challenges to human rights compatibility of the 
UK’s efforts to counter the separatist EOKA movement.54 At the start of 1958 the Human 
Rights Commission send a fact-finding team to Cyprus as part of its investigations into 
whether the circumstances on the island justified the application of emergency powers 
including detention without trial.
55
 The Acting Governor informed London that their presence 
was ‘widely resented by Security Forces and Administration here’56 and complained that 
several members of the Commission team were ‘biased against us’.57 Throughout the summer 
of 1958 the UK Government weighed breaking off engagement with the Commission 
investigations altogether as an affront to UK sovereignty against concerns that the ECHR 
already enjoyed considerable respect and that refusing to engage with the Commission would 
be embarrassing.
58
 Ultimately this crisis point in UK relations with the Council of Europe 
was not reached. The Commission Report on the derogation recognised that ‘the Government 
concerned retains, within certain limits, its discretion in appreciating the threat to the life of 
the nation’,59 and also enjoys ‘a certain measure of discretion’ in assessing the proportionality 
                                                 
51
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53
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54
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55
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56
 UK National Archives, FO 371/136395, H. Foot (Acting Governor Cyprus) to A. Lennox-Boyd (Secretary of 
State for the Colonies) (15 Jan 1958). 
57
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State for the Colonies) (18 Jan 1958). 
58
 See UK National Archives, FO 371/136406, Joint Memorandum by Foreign Office and Colonial Office 
Officials, ‘Cyprus: Human Rights’ (Jun 1958) para.9-10.  
59
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Committee of Ministers Resolution DH (97) 376 (17 Sep 1997). 
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of specific responses.
60
 The Commission limited itself to mild criticism of the delay and lack 
of detail in the UK’s derogation.61 The second application was dropped in the context of the 
peace agreement which was the precursor to Cyprus’ independence.62 In the aftermath of the 
Commission Report, however, there was some concern that Belgium wanted to see the issue 
of derogations referred to the European Court for an authoritative ruling. The UK Foreign 
Office ordered the UK representative in Strasbourg to head off this development, on the basis 
that ‘many Human Rights questions do not lend themselves to examination and decision by a 
body whose deliberations are guided by purely legal considerations to the exclusion of 
political factors. Cyprus is just such a question’.63  
Parliament would subsequently be told that the UK Government considered derogations 
to be ‘political decisions’ which ‘cannot in our view be decided on purely legal grounds’.64 
Even though the UK had taken a prominent role in drafting Article 15, and despite the 
Government being satisfied with the leeway its wording permitted to states,
65
 concerns 
remained, even after the Cyprus cases, about allowing an unproven independent judicial body 
to rule upon emergencies. During the ECHR’s first decade, when Parliament had been 
generally supine with regard to the swathe of colonial emergencies, the UK Government was 
not keen to see its practices subjected to more active oversight by Strasbourg. The 
Conservative Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, maintained that it was for Parliament ‘to see 
that no Statute contains something which would conflict with … any treaty obligations which 
we took on’,66 given that, with regard to Article 15, ‘[t]here are bound to be considerable 
arguments … as to whether a state of emergency exists’.67 The UK Government maintained 
at least the pretence that parliamentary oversight of emergency powers was both meaningful 
and sufficient. 
Once the Strasbourg Court issued its decision in Lawless v Ireland
68
 many of the UK 
Government’s concerns over its treatment of emergency situations abated. The Court asserted 
that a derogation would have to respond to ‘an exceptional situation or emergency which 
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of 
                                                 
60
 ibid., para.143. 
61
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62
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63
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64
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65
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International Law Journal 1, 4-7. 
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which the State is composed’.69 It accepted, however, that Ireland could derogate from the 
Convention notwithstanding that few lives had been lost as a result of IRA activity in the 
1950s and no threat to the state’s territorial integrity existed. As the Court’s first decision, 
Lawless marked a pivotal moment for the ECHR project with the risk, depending upon the 
outcome, that either contracting states would bridle at the constraints the system imposed or 
that individuals could have lost faith in its ability to hold states to account.
70
 In its decision 
the Court seemed, at the time, to have broadly pleased both the advocates of international 
human rights adjudication and states like the UK by restating the letter of Article 15, but in 
practice giving leeway to the state in how these terms applied. One commentor enthused that 
‘the Court seemed to divorce itself from the diplomatic … conservatism which has 
predominated in other international tribunals, and in doing so established itself as a potent 
force for the protection of human rights and freedoms’.71 Whatever the subsequent criticisms 
of the latitude granted to states by the Lawless decision
72
 at the time it undoubtedly helped to 
embed the ECHR. The UK’s delay in recognising the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction and 
denial of individual petition on ratification had been explained in Parliament on the basis that 
states, and not individuals ‘are the proper subject of international law’ and a concern that 
‘British codes of common and statute law would be subject to review by an international 
Court’.73 Nothing in the acceptance of individual petition in 1966 explains the sudden volte 
face on this point, unless the UK had really been cautiously assessing the nature of 
Strasbourg’s oversight in the early years of the ECHR. Article 15’s terms seemed to permit 
the UK’s standard practice of detention without trial in emergency situations, but before the 
Wilson Government would open the UK to challenges by individual claimants it first 
required the ECHR institutions to establish their “trustworthiness” in respect of a derogation 
provision which came to be called, in parliamentary debate, the ECHR’s ‘escape clause’.74 
The UK’s acceptance of individual petition resulted, at least in part, from the European Court 
addressing the concerns raised at the time of the Cyprus challenges.
75
 
                                                 
69
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71
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4. Deepening the Legalisation of Emergencies  
 
A range of factors have influenced the general lack of reliance upon derogations by most 
ECHR states. Perhaps the most important reason why derogations have played a much less 
prominent role than the treaty’s drafters expected is that no state, during its ECHR 
membership, has suffered the ravages of total war. Where ECHR states have gone to war 
with each other, including Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 197476 and the war between Russia 
and Georgia in 2008,
77
 these conflicts have not been marked by derogations.
78
 Where states 
have had to tackle non-international armed conflicts whilst subject to the ECHR, these 
conflicts have seen limited reliance upon derogations,
79
 with the exception of Turkey’s 
derogations to facilitate its military action against the PKK between the 1970s and 1990s.
80
 In 
the counter-terrorism context, most of the ECHR states which have sought to tackle violent 
Marxist groups and ethno-nationalist irredentists from the 1950s onwards did not rely on 
derogations.
81
  
This general reluctance to issue derogations in response to terrorist violence has often 
been explained in terms of their effect of raising an emergency situation’s visibility on the 
international stage. Colin Warbrick also emphasises the effect of the ‘flexible’ nature of 
qualified ECHR rights in often negating the need for derogations,
82
 whereas Brice Dickson 
identifies the impact of negative memories of states of emergency within many European 
states in turning policy makers away from derogations even when they have been confronting 
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terrorist threats.
83
 That the UK was comparatively unburdened by such experiences made 
derogations more attractive to its policy makers as legal tool facilitating the application of 
standard emergency powers such as internment in a counter-terrorism context. But this factor 
does not, of itself, explain why derogations became such a prominent feature within the UK’s 
engagement with the ECHR. Only when derogations came to be associated with loose 
parliamentary and judicial oversight in the minds of UK policy makers did they become a 
stock element of the UK’s response to terrorism. 
Soon after the first rash of colonial derogations the UK authorities began to appreciate a 
potential problem with ECHR compliance closer to home. In Northern Ireland the Special 
Powers Acts 1922-43 maintained the emergency responses which the Unionist Government 
had implemented at the time of partition. It was not until these powers started to be employed 
with the internment of over 400 suspects in response to renewed IRA activity in 1957 (the 
same circumstances which prompted Ireland’s derogation and the Lawless case), that a 
derogation was issued regarding these provisions.
84
 Whereas Ireland’s derogation was lasted 
just two years, successive UK Governments were forced to maintain the derogation covering 
Northern Ireland as the devolved administration refused to weaken the Special Powers Acts. 
The Wilson Government frequently relied upon this derogation to deflect awkward 
parliamentary questions regarding human rights in Northern Ireland.
85
 Derogations might on 
some level be embarrassing, but there was no denying their usefulness as a means of 
deflecting unwanted attention. Even Wilson eventually tired of this charade, going so far as to 
inform Parliament in 1969 that he considered that ‘this source of embarrassment should be 
removed as soon as possible’.86 These efforts towards reform came too late, as Northern 
Ireland had already begun to lurch into the genuine crisis of the “Troubles”. The 1957 
derogation was replaced with a new derogation in August 1971 to allow for an extension of 
emergency powers and the renewed application of internment.
87
 This derogation covered only 
the use of emergency powers in Northern Ireland and was not extended to cover the UK-wide 
counter-terrorism measures enacted in response to the Provisional IRA’s first attacks in Great 
Britain in 1974.
88
 Archival records reveal the two concerns which militated against a further 
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notice of a derogation were whether ‘the prevailing level of terrorist activity’ reached the 
ECHR threshold for an emergency and ‘the undesirability of conceding to the world that 
terrorist activities constituted such a major threat’.89 Political and legal concerns had melded 
seamlessly in official thinking on derogations. 
The widespread use of internment powers in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975, 
accompanied by reports of torture and coercive interrogation techniques in detention centres, 
saw Ireland launch an inter-state challenge in relation to the UK’s human rights record in 
Northern Ireland.
90
 Whilst the European Court ultimately found that the UK had inflicted 
inhuman and degrading treatment upon some internees, it was once again at pains not to 
invalidate the UK derogation, emphasising that ‘it is certainly not the Court’s function to 
substitute for the British Government’s assessment any other assessment of what might be the 
most prudent or expedient policy to combat terrorism’.91 Through its acceptance of this risk 
assessment the Court effectively granted the UK Government a wide margin of appreciation 
in terms of both the existence of an emergency and the proportionality of the internment 
measures taken to address it.
92
 The Court was admitting that ‘[d]erogatory measures are 
assumed to belong to the hot-blooded sphere of governmental policy rather than the cool, 
technical sphere of legal reasoning’.93  
In extending a margin of appreciation over both a state’s findings of fact and the 
Court’s interpretation of how the ECHR applied in an emergency, Ireland v United Kingdom 
might have been an embarrassing decision for the UK Government, but it was not one which 
foreclosed emergency responses. The Court’s decision, in effect, fortified the non-derogable 
Article 3 at the expense of derogable rights. The UK was able to maintain its derogation, with 
Northern Ireland Office officials considering that ‘although HMG takes measures which are 
in derogation of our obligations under … the Convention we are still operating under the 
terms of the … Convention because they allow such derogations if certain circumstances are 
met’.94 From the outset of the ECHR system derogations had attracted little political 
attention, but Ireland v United Kingdom affirmed that Strasbourg’s oversight was at best 
“light touch”. Derogations therefore marked the ‘path of least resistance’ in terms of both 
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legal and political oversight when it came to dealing with terrorism.
95
 Strasbourg remained an 
important concern, as seen in anxious inter-departmental correspondence
96
 regarding the 
interstate challenge which France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden mounted 
against Turkey’s 1980 derogation,97 but UK Governments placed increasing reliance upon the 
European Court’s jurisprudence. 
Internment had, however, been thoroughly tarnished as a response to terrorism in 
Northern Ireland, and the UK’s derogation was focused upon the power to detain individuals 
without trial.
98
 In August 1984, seeking to trumpet the UK’s shift to a counter-terrorism 
strategy based around criminal law which was intended to delegitimise paramilitary groups, 
the UK withdrew its derogation from Article 5. The Government did so in the course of the 
summer parliamentary recess, thereby avoiding awkward questions, and presented the shift as 
a sign of its concern for human rights.
99
 But at a stage when the “Troubles” seemed 
particularly intractable and when internment had not been in operation for almost a decade, 
the Thatcher Government did not seem to be losing any security dividend in giving up the 
derogation and relying instead upon the qualifications and limitations within many of the 
ECHR rights to sustain its security measures.
100
 From the outset, however, Government legal 
advisers noted that this criminalisation approach relied upon a heavily modified version of 
criminal due process, including police powers of pre-charge detention for up to seven days 
without judicial oversight,
101
 and that without the cover of a derogation ECHR compliance 
was dependent upon the European Court operating ‘not too strict an approach to these 
provisions’.102  
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 In Brogan
103
 Strasbourg refused to oblige, maintaining that even in the circumstances 
of a terrorist campaign the right to liberty required judicial oversight of police powers of 
detention prior to charges being brought.
104
 Following this decision the Home Secretary 
Douglas Hurd asked the Commons for time to consider the possible responses.
105
 Two weeks 
later, on the final day of the parliamentary session before the Christmas recess, in a standing 
committee considering the reform of counter-terrorism measures, the Home Secretary 
announced that the UK would derogate from the ECHR.
106
 The day after Parliament went 
into recess the Council of Europe was notified that the UK was issuing a new derogation. 
Once again, the legalised nature of the derogation system allowed the UK to side-step 
parliamentary safeguards. Through the efforts of successive UK Governments’ to minimise 
the oversight of their counter-terrorism activities, emergencies went from being an issue so 
intrinsically political that the European Court could not be trusted to adjudicate upon them in 
the 1950s, to being considered so legalised by the 1980s that Parliament could be 
marginalised in derogation decisions. 
Once the derogation was in place it was maintained without much parliamentary 
difficulty. The House of Commons was simply informed in writing that the derogation would 
remain in place for as long as the Government considered it to be necessary.
107
 Thereafter the 
maintenance of the derogation was rolled into the annual renewal debates on the counter-
terrorism legislation. Difficulties began to mount, however, as a result of the lag between the 
derogation entering force and the Strasbourg Court pronouncing upon its ECHR 
compatibility. In this window, both the Opposition and groups involved in the struggle in 
Northern Ireland made hay out of the Brogan decision. Tony Blair, then Shadow Home 
Secretary, attacked the Government’s handling of the affair just before the European Court 
addressed the first cases arising out of the derogation; ‘We have had to derogate from the 
convention, and our reputation abroad is attacked as a transgressor of human rights’.108  
 These criticisms were, however, deflected by the European Court’s decision in 
Brannigan and McBride,
109
 which upheld the validity of the UK’s renewed derogation 
because ‘the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international 
judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of 
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derogations necessary to avert it’.110 The Court’s dilemma is evident within the decision.111 
Northern Ireland represented a particular difficulty in being an ‘entrenched’112 emergency 
covered by near-continuous derogations for over 40 years. In this context any meaningful 
distinction between normality and emergency had all but disappeared and the compromises in 
terms of human rights protection imposed by derogations became particularly difficult to 
justify.
113
 In Brannigan and McBride the Court acknowledged but did not address these 
concerns, stating only that it would ‘give appropriate weight to such relevant factors as the 
nature of the rights affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to, and the duration 
of, the emergency situation’.114 Some seven years later, in Marshall,115 a challenge by a 
person affected by the use of extended detention powers after the main paramilitary groups in 
Northern Ireland had issued ceasefires, the Court continued to accept ‘that there had been no 
return to normality … such as to lead the Court to controvert the authorities’ assessment of 
the situation … in terms of the threats which organised violence posed for the life of the 
community and the search for a peaceful settlement’.116  
 Outward manifestations of parliamentary oversight were an important factor in 
Strasbourg granting the UK this sustained margin of appreciation. In Brannigan and McBride 
the Court noted how independent reviews of counter-terrorism powers, including 
extraordinary pre-charge detention, were presented to Parliament
117
 and how legislators had 
been informed of the derogation’s introduction.118 This consideration of Parliament’s review 
of the emergency and the proportionality of the response was nonetheless cursory. Neither the 
shortcomings in how the derogation was first presented to Parliament, nor the lack of 
substantive consideration of the independent reviews, were addressed by the Court. In 
Marshall, however, the consideration of parliamentary scrutiny was more assertive, with the 
Court noting that the independent reviewer had repeatedly called for judicial oversight of pre-
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charge detention.
119
 This subtle change in emphasis was nonetheless easy to miss, perhaps 
because the assessment of Parliament’s oversight of the derogation’s necessity was less 
important for the Court than the fact that the UK had withdrawn its derogation by the time it 
issued its decision.
120
 
The European Court’s scrutiny of emergency powers was therefore linked to the 
circumstances of a derogation. A country like the UK, with ostensibly active parliamentary 
oversight and a generally good human rights record, could leverage this record for a 
‘generous’121 margin of appreciation in emergency situations, and certainly a wider one than 
the Court would extend to a country with a more dubious record.
122
 Turkey, by contrast, fell 
foul of the Court’s assessment of whether measures were strictly required by the 
circumstances of the emergency affecting its South-Eastern provinces in Aksoy.
123
 As this 
decision aligned with the hardening of ECHR control mechanisms,
124
 with compulsory 
individual petition preventing states from threatening to restrict judicial oversight to inter-
state claims,
125
 Strasbourg could have been signalling a new approach to derogations. But 
after Marshall UK policy makers could remain confident that this decision did not 
compromise their use of derogations. Parliament could continue to be bought off with 
assurances that the European Court monitored derogations, whilst Strasbourg checked for the 
form, but not the substance, of parliamentary oversight in the course of granting a wide 
margin of appreciation. Even after the UK’s counter-terrorism powers were “normalised” 
after the Troubles, this perceived oversight gap meant that the UK’s response to the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks would invariably involve a derogation. 
 
5. The Swansong for UK Derogations? 
 
By 2001 derogations had become the default option for the UK Government in the face of 
crises great and small, attracting limited scrutiny from either the legislature (which could be 
cowed by talk of special security circumstances and intelligence briefings known only to 
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ministers
126
) or by judges in Strasbourg, who had explicitly recognised the primacy of 
executive threat assessments. The only unknown quantity in terms of oversight, since the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, was how the domestic judiciary would approach 
derogations, but the auguries suggested continued executive freedom of action. Within days 
of the Al-Qaeda attacks Lord Hoffmann issued an opinion in which he emphasised ‘the need 
for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers’ in the context of 
national security, because of the expert advice the executive can draw upon and their 
legitimacy as elected actors.
127
 Once again, the judiciary seemed to be conceding to 
Parliament the task of overseeing actions taken in response to emergency situations, at the 
same time that Article 15’s operation ensured that Parliament expected that the judiciary 
would apply the test for a derogation. Even as legal commentators pointed out the laxity of 
that test,
128
 its imposingly legalistic terms combined with respect for official security 
assessments to impose a ‘veil of ignorance’ upon Parliament.129  
Into this scrutiny gap the Blair Government pushed Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001, which authorised the detention without trial of any foreign 
national present in the UK whom the Home Secretary suspected of having links to 
international terrorism but who could not be deported due to the ‘real risk’130 of torture or 
inhuman and degrading treatment they faced in their home country. As deportation of such 
individuals was not possible this measure could not be accommodated within the exceptions 
to the right to liberty,
131
 necessitating a derogation from Article 5 ECHR. The Human Rights 
Act had enhanced Parliament’s involvement in the issuing of a derogation,132 with MPs 
having to accept a statutory instrument authorising the derogation.
133
 The other newly-minted 
element of Parliament’s human rights procedure, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
provided parliamentarians with detailed guidance into the legislative proposals and Article 15 
in advance of the Commons’ statutory instrument debate.134 Although this debate was 
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confined to a 90-minute session late one November night, the Government was challenged 
over a how a derogation could be squared with its claims that its legislation was human-rights 
compatible.
135
 The Government’s blithe response was that because the ECHR provides a 
derogation mechanism,
136
 using it ‘preserves unequivocally – this is an important point – our 
international obligations’.137 This assertion conforms to the logic of Brannigan and McBride 
in which ‘the Court endorsed the notion that derogation is a viable alternative to 
compliance’.138  
 In Belmarsh Detainees
139
 a nine-judge House of Lords panel supplied the missing piece 
of the derogation oversight puzzle; domestic judicial oversight. The seven-judge majority 
position accepted that grounds for a derogation existed, in line with Strasbourg’s generous 
jurisprudence in this regard,
140
 but refused to accept that the steps taken under the UK’s 
derogation were strictly required by the exigencies of the Al-Qaeda threat. The most 
important basis for this decision was that there was no objective rationale for a separate 
security regime applicable to foreign nationals whilst ‘leavening British suspects at large’ and 
that the manner in which the regime operated enabled suspected nationals ‘to leave the 
country with impunity’ if a third country would permit entry.141 As Lord Bingham explained, 
the majority position rested on the proposition that ‘the more purely political (in a broad or 
narrow sense) a question is, the more appropriate it will be for political resolution and the less 
likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision ... Conversely, the greater the legal 
content of any issue, the greater the potential role of the court’.142  
 Judicial oversight of a derogation’s proportionality does not, therefore, wholly 
substitute for shortcomings in parliamentary oversight of whether an emergency exists (the 
more “political” aspect of the derogation equation). Parliament was nonetheless well placed 
to follow up on Belmarsh Detainees as part of a ‘legislative-judicial dialogue’.143 The House 
of Lords decision to issue a declaration of incompatibility
144
 and its quashing of the statutory 
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instrument by which Parliament authorised the derogation, did not of themselves trigger the 
release of any detainees. But as parliamentarians took up this challenge the Blair Government 
abandoned its stock response that derogations were a form of compatibility with human rights 
and pledged that the detention regime would be replaced in a manner that would not rely 
upon a derogation and would be ‘consistent with the ECHR’.145 As Helen Fenwick and Gavin 
Phillipson assert, ‘[t]he withdrawal of the derogation from the right to liberty amounted to a 
public affirmation by the British government of its intention to protect British citizens from 
terrorism while remaining within … normal human rights standards’.146 
Over four years later, in A v United Kingdom,
147
 Strasbourg finally became involved in 
the case, addressing issues left over from Belmarsh Detainees. This meant that, because a 
ruling that the derogation did not comply with Article 15’s requirements no longer affected 
operative UK law, the Court’s Grand Chamber was able to reassess its existing case law in a 
relatively uncontroversial context.
148
 Even with this leeway the unanimous judgment 
recapitulated the House of Lords’ summary of case law on whether an emergency existed,149 
and accepted that it is ‘for each Government, as the guardian of their own people’s safety, to 
make its own assessment on the basis of the facts known to it’.150 Nothing in this approach 
seems to displace claims that ‘the de facto existence of a state of emergency is left to the 
political sphere’, and more specifically to executive actors.151 As for the assessment of 
whether detention without trial was proportionate, the Grand Chamber stuck closely to the 
domestic court’s line of reasoning.152 This decision has therefore drawn adverse comment for 
‘expressly endorsing a wide margin of appreciation on both legal questions – public 
emergency and proportionality of measures’.153 
The Court did, however, confined this wide margin of appreciation to ‘relations 
between the domestic authorities and the Court’, thereby encouraging domestic courts not to 
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adhere to its light-touch approach.
154
 By endorsing the House of Lords’ proportionality 
assessment, Strasbourg effectively delegated the primary responsibility for evaluating a 
derogation’s validity to domestic courts, emphasising that such review should not be clouded 
by the margin of appreciation.
155
 This approach might appear to push oversight of 
derogations even further into the legal sphere, at the risk of marginalising the involvement of 
domestic assemblies in scrutinising their inception and operation. Strasbourg, however, also 
linked its extensive the margin of appreciation to parliamentary engagement with relevant 
expert reports into a derogation.
156
 Building upon its earlier approach in Marshall, the Court 
picked up on the cursory Government responses to the Newton Committee report
157
 and Joint 
Committee on Human Rights reports
158
 on Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act and the European Commissioner for Human Rights’ complaints regarding ‘the lack of 
sufficient scrutiny by Parliament of the derogation provisions’.159 These considerations 
wrong-footed UK Government attempts to claim that executive detention ‘was not only the 
product of the judgment of the Government but was also the subject of debate in 
Parliament’.160 The Court might be delegating the primary responsibility for assessing 
invocations of Article 15 to domestic organs, but such a delegation cannot be dismissed as 
neglecting its own oversight duties. 
 
6. The Future of Derogations 
 
Although the limited role played by derogations has been one of the most surprising features 
of the ECHR’s history,161 equally remarkable has been how the UK has bucked this general 
trend. Derogations are by their nature ‘politically significant’, flagging up the use of practices 
which can cause an administration embarrassment.
162
 Nonetheless, as successive UK 
governments found to their advantage, the legalised format of derogations also provides a 
means of closing off parliamentary opposition. In emergency situations a veneer of legality, 
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which David Dyzenhaus describes as ‘a legal grey hole’,163 can prove particularly corrosive 
to efforts to hold official actions to account. Only when the ECHR system was integrated into 
the UK’s domestic legal orders did the room for manoeuvre so readily exploited by 
successive UK governments become more restricted. 
 But even as derogations have seemingly become less attractive to the UK, 2015 saw 
both Ukraine and France issue derogations, which in their form and timing point to the 
influence of UK practice. The Ukrainian derogation, in June 2015, was issued in the context 
of fighting between government forces and Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and 
Lugansk which had broken out in April 2014. The delay in this derogation, approved by 
Ukraine’s Parliament more than a year after ‘anti-terrorist operations’ had commenced,164 and 
almost 8 months after the Ukrainian President had announced that it would be sought,
165
 
takes advantage the absence of time limits on derogation applications under the ECHR. It 
aligns with UK practice in the 1950s and 1960s when there were long delays between the 
onset of an emergency and a derogation notification. France derogated to enable it to institute 
a nationwide état d’urgence in response to the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015. 
Although France notified the Council of Europe within two weeks of the attacks, its 
derogation notice contained little detail, noting that an emergency existed because ‘[t]he 
terrorist threat in France is of a lasting nature, having regard to information from the 
intelligence services and to the international context’ and that the measures adopted in 
response ‘appeared necessary to prevent the commission of further terrorist attacks’.166 
Nothing in the unanimous Grand Chamber decision in A v United Kingdom suggests that, in 
any legal challenge arising from these derogations, Strasbourg will be quick to revisit its own 
standards in applying the key tests for a derogation. This case does, nonetheless, indicate that 
a derogating state will have to demonstrate robust domestic oversight of its emergency 
powers if it is to take advantage of the broad margin of appreciation available under Article 
15. A challenge to the French or Ukrainian derogations will test whether the Court is willing 
to sustain this approach, and extend it to cover the timing and content of a derogation notice. 
If it is not, derogations could begin to play an increasingly significant role in the life of the 
ECHR. 
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